Abstract. At Eurocrypt '03, Goh and Jarecki showed that, contrary to other signature schemes in the discrete-log setting, the EDL signature scheme has a tight security reduction, namely to the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, in the Random Oracle (RO) model. They also remarked that EDL can be turned into an off-line/on-line signature scheme using the technique of Shamir and Tauman, based on chameleon hash functions.
Introduction
In a signature scheme, a party, called signer, generates a signature using his own private key so that any other party, called verifier, can check the validity of the signature using the corresponding signer's public-key. Following the IEEE P1363 standard [P1363] , there are two main settings commonly used to build signature schemes: the integer factorization setting and the discrete logarithm setting.
A signature scheme should protect against impersonation of parties and alteration of messages. Informally, the security is assessed by showing that if an adversary can violate one of the two previous properties then the same adversary can also break the underlying cryptographic problem -for example, the integer factorization problem, the RSA problem [RSA78] , the discrete logarithm problem or the Diffie-Hellman problem [DH76] . As the cryptographic problem is supposed to be intractable, no such adversary exists. This methodology for assessing the security is called security reduction. The "quality" of the reduction is given by the success probability of the adversary against a signature scheme to break the underlying intractable problem. A security reduction is said tight when this success probability is close to 1; otherwise it is said close or loose [MR02] . This notion of tightness is very important, and allows to distinguish between asymptotic security and exact security, the first one meaning that a scheme is secure for sufficiently large parameters, while the second one means that the underlying cryptographic problem is almost as hard to solve as the scheme to break.
The first efficient signature scheme tightly related to the RSA problem is due to Bellare and Rogaway [BR96] . The security stands in the Random Oracle (RO) model [BR93] where hash functions are idealized as random oracles. Their scheme, called RSA-PSS, appears in most recent cryptographic standards. Other RSA-based signature schemes shown to be secure in the standard model include [GHR99] and [CS00] .
Amongst the signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem (or on the Diffie-Hellman problem), we quote the ElGamal scheme [ElG85] , the Schnorr scheme [Sch91] , and the Girault-Poupard-Stern scheme [Gir91, PS98] . The security of these schemes is assessed (in the RO model) thanks to the forking lemma by Pointcheval and Stern [PS96] . Basically, the idea consists in running the adversary twice with different hash oracles so that it eventually gets two distinct valid forgeries on the same message. The disadvantage of the forking lemma technique is that the so-obtained security reductions are loose.
Even if the security reductions are loose, those signature schemes present the nice feature that there are very efficient on-line [FS87] compared to RSAbased signature schemes. In the off-line phase, the signer precomputes a quantity (independent of the message) called a coupon that will be used in the on-line phase to produce very quickly a signature on an arbitrary message.
To date, the only signature scheme whose security is tightly related to the discrete logarithm problem or to the Diffie-Hellman problem (in the RO model) is EDL, a scheme independently considered in [CP92] and [JS99] . Indeed, at Eurocrypt '03, Goh and Jarecki [GJ03] showed that the security of EDL can be reduced in a tight way to the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Its on-line version as suggested in [GJ03] requires the recent technique by Shamir and Tauman [ST01] based on chameleon hash functions [KR00] and so is not as efficient as the aforementioned signature schemes: the resulting signatures are longer and the verification is slower.
It is to note that EDL was recently modified by Katz and Wang [KW03] into a scheme with shorter signatures and a tight security reduction but on a stronger assumption, namely the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. In the same paper, Katz and Wang also proposed an improvement to EDL, that uses a single bit instead of a long random, and which has a tight reduction to the CDH problem. The cost of this nice improvement is simply a decrease of the security parameter of one bit.
To finalize the related work part, we stress that the shortest signature scheme that is known today is a scheme of Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [BLS04] . This scheme is loosely related to the CDH problem, but gives very short signatures, as it consists in only one single group element. However, this scheme is limited to certain elliptic and hyper-elliptic curve groups, and so less general than EDL. Furthermore, the on-line version of the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme requires the technique by Shamir and Tauman, which doubles the size of the signature, and hence is less interesting.
Our contribution. In this paper, we firstly review the definition of EDL, its proof by Goh and Jarecki, and the scheme of Katz and Wang. Secondly, we propose a new signature scheme which, similarly to EDL, features a tight security reduction relatively to the CDH problem but whose resulting signatures are smaller than EDL signatures. Furthermore, contrary to EDL, no additional trick is needed to turn our signature scheme in an off-line/on-line version.
Notably, in elliptic curve settings, our scheme supersedes other discrete logarithm based schemes with same security level, as it uses signatures that are 25% smaller.
Organization of the paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give some background on signature schemes and provide a brief introduction to "provable" security. Then, in Section 3, we review the EDL signature scheme and its proof by Goh and Jarecki. Section 4 is the core of our paper. We describe our signature scheme, prove that its security is tightly related to CDH in the RO model and show how it outperforms EDL. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Definitions
In this section, we remind some background on signature schemes and on their security. We also define the Diffie-Hellman and the discrete logarithm problems. We then provide a brief introduction to provable security. Finally, we review the concept of on-the-fly signatures.
Signature Schemes
A signature scheme Sig = (GenKey, Sign, Verify) is defined by the three following algorithms:
-The key generation algorithm GenKey. On input 1 k , algorithm GenKey produces a pair (pk, sk) of matching public (verification) and private (signing) keys.
-The signing algorithm Sign. Given a message m in a set of messages M and a pair of matching public and private keys (pk, sk), Sign produces a signature σ. The signing algorithm can be probabilistic. -The verification algorithm Verify. Given a signature σ, a message m ∈ M and a public key pk, Verify tests whether σ is a valid signature of m with respect to pk.
Several security notions have been defined about signature schemes, mainly based on the seminal work of Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [GMR84, GMR88] . It is now customary to ask for the impossibility of existential forgeries, even against adaptive chosen-message adversaries:
-An existential forgery is a new message-signature pair, valid and generated by the adversary. The corresponding security notion is called existential unforgeability (EUF). -The verification key is public, including to the adversary. But more information may also be available. The strongest kind of information is definitely formalized by the adaptive chosen-message attacks (CMA), where the attacker can ask the signer to sign any message of its choice, in an adaptive way.
As a consequence, we say that a signature scheme is secure if it prevents existential forgeries, even under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA). This is measured by the following success probability, which should be negligibly small, for any adversary A which outputs a valid signature σ on a message m that was never submitted to the signature oracle, 3 within a "reasonable" bounded running-time and with at most q s signature queries to the signature oracle:
In the random oracle model [BR93] , adversary A has also access to a hash oracle: A is allowed to make at most q h queries to the hash oracle.
The Diffie-Hellman and the Discrete Logarithm Problems
The security of signature schemes relies on problems that are supposed intractable, such as the Diffie-Hellman problem [DH76] or the discrete logarithm problem.
Let G be a (multiplicatively written) abelian group. Given an element g ∈ G of prime order q, we let G g,q ⊆ G denote the cyclic group generated by g, i.e.,
Let x be a random number in Z q . Define y = g x . Being given (g, y), the discrete logarithm problem in G g,q is defined as finding the value of x. In this paper, the discrete logarithm of y w.r.t. g will be denoted as DL g (y) = x. On the other hand, being given (g, y, g a ), for an unknown random number a in Z q , the (computational) Diffie-Hellman problem is defined as returning g ax = y a .
For cryptographic applications, group G g,q is chosen so that the problems are (supposed) hard. A classical example is to choose G g,q ⊆ F p * , where q divides (p − 1). Another widely used group family is the one of elliptic curves over finite fields [Mil85, Kob87, BSS99] .
There are plenty of such signature schemes, including the schemes by ElGa- [Sch91] , and particulary the one we are interested in this paper, the EDL scheme [CP92,JS99,GJ03].
Security Reduction and Provable Security
Today, schemes are "proved" secure, using what is called a reduction. For this reason, some authors prefer to use the term of reductionist security (e.g., [KM04] ) instead of provable security.
Basically, the idea is to prove that a scheme is secure by exhibiting a machine (the so-called reduction) that uses a chosen-message attacker on a given signature scheme, in order to solve a hard cryptographic problem. In the standard model, the attacker is used by simulating signature queries on q s chosen-messages. In addition, in the random oracle mode, the simulator also simulates hash queries on q h chosen data.
Two classes of provably secure signature schemes can be distinguished. The first class of provable signature schemes proposes reductions that are said loose, as they can turn an attacker into a machine to solve the cryptographic problem asymptotically. The second class of provable signature schemes features so-called tight reductions, using the attacker to solve the problem with almost the same probability.
Of course, tightly secure schemes are the preferred ones, but there are just few of them. Notably, RSA-PSS and its derivatives are tightly related to the RSA problem [RSA78, BR96, Cor02] , and Rabin-PSS is equivalent to the factorisation problem [Rab79] . For a long time, no tightly secure schemes were known, based on the Diffie-Hellman or discrete logarithm problems, but only loosely secure schemes, as their security was shown thanks to the forking lemma technique by Pointcheval and Stern [PS96] . Proved recently at Eurocrypt '03, the EDL scheme is the first tight secure scheme, based on the computational DiffieHellman problem.
Signature with Coupons
Some signature schemes have the nice feature that one can precompute (off-line) some quantities, independent from the messages, called coupons, and use them in a very fast way to generate signatures once the message is received [FS87] . Such signature schemes are also known as on-the-fly signature schemes.
This coupon technique is very useful, especially in constrained environments such as smart cards and finds numerous applications. Most signature schemes based on discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problems allow the use of coupons. However, as previously explained, they do not offer a tight security reduction. To our knowledge, the only exception is the EDL signature scheme using a technique proposed by Shamir and Tauman, based on chameleon hashes by Krawczyk and Rabin [ST01, KR00] . However, this use of chameleon hashes is at the price of a slower verification, as the verifier must compute chameleon hashes (which are multi-exponentiations) before verifying the signature.
3 The EDL Signature
The Scheme
The EDL signature scheme, independently proposed in [CP92, JS99] , is defined as follows.
Global set-up: Let ℓ p , ℓ q , and ℓ r denote security parameters.
4 Let also a cyclic group G g,q of order q, generated by g, where q is a ℓ q -bit prime and the representation of the elements of G g,q is included in {0, 1}
ℓp . Finally, let two hash functions, H : M × {0, 1} ℓr → G g,q and G : (G g,q ) 6 → Z q .
Key generation:
The private key is a random number x ∈ Z q . The corresponding public key is y = g x .
Signature: To sign a message m ∈ M, one first randomly chooses r ∈ {0, 1} ℓr , and computes h = H(m, r) and z = h x . Follows a proof of logarithm equality that DL h (z) = DL g (y): for a random number k ∈ Z q , one computes
The signature on m is σ = (z, r, s, c).
In EDL, the only quantity that can be precomputed in off-line signature phase is u. The on-line part is so two hash function evaluations plus two modular exponentiations.
Security of EDL
In this section, we reduce the security of EDL to the security of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The proof basically follows the one originally presented in [GJ03] by showing that the EDL scheme is a proof that DL h (z) = DL g (y) = x.
Theorem 1 ([GJ03]
). Let A be an adversary which can produce, with success probability ε, an existential forgery under a chosen-message attack within time τ , after q h queries to the hash oracles and q s queries to the signing oracle, in the random oracle model. Then the computational DiffieHellman problem can be solved with success probability ε ′ within time τ ′ , with
where τ 0 is the time for an exponentiation in G g,q .
Proof. We are given a group G g,q and a CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ). We will use an attacker A against the EDL signature scheme to solve this challenge, i.e., to find g ax . Our attacker A, after q H (resp. q G ) hash queries to H (resp. G) oracle and q s signature queries, is able to produce a signature forgery with probability ε within time τ . We let q h = q H + q G .
Attacker A is run with the following simulation:
Initialization: A is initialized with public key y = g x and public parameters (g, q, G g,q ).
Answering new G(g, h, y, z, u, v) query: The simulator returns a random number in Z q .
Answering new H(m, r) query: The simulator generates a random number d ∈ Z q , and returns (g a ) g d .
Answering signature query on m ∈ M: The simulator generates a random number r ∈ {0, 1} ℓr . If H(m, r) is already set, the simulator fails and stops (Event 1). Else, the simulator generates a random number κ ∈ Z q , sets
. Then, the simulator randomly picks (s, c) ∈ Z q × Z q and computes u = g s y −c and v = h s z −c . If G(g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set, the simulator fails and stops (Event 2). Else, the simulator sets G(g, h, y, z, u, v) = c and returns the valid signature (z, r, s, c).
As we can see, the simulation is valid and indistinguishable from an actual signer, except for some events:
-Event 1: As r is a random number in {0, 1} ℓr , the probability that the H(m, r) is already set is less than qH+qs 2 ℓr , for one signature query. For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by qs·(qH+qs) 2 ℓr . -Event 2: From the simulation, the input tuples to the G oracle are of the
is not known by the attacker (else, Event 1 would have happened), κ is absolutely random for the attacker. Hence, the probability that G(g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set is less than qG +qs q 2 . For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by
Solving the CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ): Except when these two rare events occur, attacker A returns, with probability ε, a valid signature forgery σ = (z, r, s, c) on a message m that was not submitted to the signature oracle,
Now, we calculate the probability that the attacker outputs a valid forgery but with
, it follows, as the forgery is valid, that k = s − cx mod q and k
is not defined (else, Event 2 would have happened), it follows that the relation c = G(g, h, y, h
mod q is never satisfied, except with probability qG q . Putting all together, we can conclude that the EDL signature scheme is tightly as secure as the Diffie-Hellman problem: the success probability ε ′ of our reduction satisfies
where τ 0 is the time required for an exponentiation. ⊓ ⊔
Features of the EDL Signature
The EDL signature scheme is proven secure relatively to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, with a tight reduction. Hence, its security is a strong point. The scheme yields signatures of (ℓ p +2ℓ q +ℓ r ) bits. This may appear somewhat long but actually it is not, given such a strong security.
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In its classical use, the scheme cannot be used with coupons, but, as noted by Goh and Jarecki, one can use the technique of [ST01] based on chameleon hash functions [KR00] to transform this signature into a signature with coupons, what we will call EDL-CH in the sequel. Producing a EDL-CH signature forgery is equivalent to produce a signature forgery in the regular EDL signature scheme, or to find a collision in the chameleon hash function. Hence, the natural way to get a signature with coupons and with a tight security reduction to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to use a chameleon hash function whose collisionresistance is also based on discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problem (e.g., H(m, r) = H 0 (g m y r ), where H 0 : G g,q → G g,q is a hash function). But the cost of this way to create coupons is a slower verification. Further, using the chameleon hash H(m, r) = H 0 (g m y r ) implies that one needs to define random number r ∈ Z q (and not in {0, 1} ℓr ). This makes the EDL-CH signatures slightly longer: (ℓ p + 3ℓ q ) bits.
Katz-Wang Signature Scheme
In [KW03] , Katz and Wang proposed two modifications of EDL, one which consists in a scheme with short signatures tightly based on the DDH assumption, and one another that uses signature shorter than EDL but keeps tightly related to the CDH problem. In this section, we briefly remind the second scheme.
The idea of Katz and Wang is to remove the randomness of r, and to replace it by unpredictability. Namely, r is replaced by a bit b that can only be computed by the signer (e.g., b is the result of a PRF, under a secret key included in the signing key):
6 the signatures are then (z, s, c, b), and so are shorter than EDL signatures by 110 bits. The proof of EDL is then slightly modified for Katz-Wang scheme. For H(m, b) queries, the simulator computes the bit value corresponding to m, then:
-if this value is b, the returned value is of the form g κ , which allows to compute corresponding z very simply: z = (g x ) κ ; -if this value is not b, the returned value is of the form (g a ) g d .
Consequently, it is simple for the simulator to reply to signature queries, as it knows the right value b for each message m. On the contrary, as b cannot be guessed by the forger better than randomly for any new message m, its forge will be with the wrong b with a probability 1 2 , and with this probability, the CDH problem will be solved by the simulator.
Hence, this modification gives a signature scheme with a signature length of (ℓ p + 2ℓ q + 1) bits, and which is just one bit less secure than EDL when taking same parameters. Unfortunately, in this scheme, only u can be computed off-line, and so the on-line part of the signature is two modular exponentiations in G g,q .
Our Signature Scheme
Looking at the description of EDL, we can see that basically two random values are used: k is used to generate a proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm while r is used to ensure that the attacker cannot predict the value of h, that will be used during simulations.
More precisely, in EDL, h is taken equal to H(m, r), with a sufficiently large random number r. As RSA-PSS does in a certain sense, the goal is to avoid, with overwhelming probability, that the attacker requests the value of H(m,
Our first idea is the following: Why not trying to put the randomness of k inside H(m, ·) instead of using another random number r that increases the size of the signature? Clearly, one cannot use H(m, k) directly, but H(m, u) looks promising (and appears to be secure, as proven in Appendix B). As a result, the size of the so-constructed signature is reduced.
Our second idea is the following: Would it be possible to put m inside G(·) rather than in H(·), as done in [Sch91] or in [KW03] ? The goal here is to allow as many precomputations as possible. This trick does not apply to EDL, but when combined with the previously suggested technique, the answer appears to be positive. Intuitively, using z = H(r) x and putting m in G(·) in EDL is insecure because an attacker could easily reuse a z returned by the signer, and so a simulator would not solve a CDH problem. On the contrary, in our construction, we will show that using z = H(u)
x remains secure, as an attacker could not reuse an H(u)
x returned by the signer, unless the discrete logarithm is revealed: indeed, u satisfies a certain relation (u = g s y −c ) that cannot be given for two different c's for the same u without revealing the discrete logarithm.
In this section, we describe more formally our scheme and prove strictly the intuition that we have just given.
Description
Our scheme goes as follows:
Global set-up: Let ℓ p and ℓ q denote security parameters. Let also a cyclic group G g,q of order q, generated by g, where q is a ℓ q -bit prime and the representation of the elements of G g,q is included in {0, 1} ℓp . Finally, let two hash functions, H : G g,q → G g,q and G : M × (G g,q )
6 → Z q .
Key generation:
Signature: To sign a message m ∈ M, one first randomly chooses k ∈ Z q , and computes u = g k , h = H(u), z = h x and v = h k . Next, one computes c = G(m, g, h, y, z, u, v) and s = k +cx mod q. The signature on m is σ = (z, s, c).
As an advantage, our signatures are smaller than the EDL's ones: they are only (ℓ p + 2ℓ q )-bit long. We still have to prove that the scheme is tightly related to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, which is done in the next section -but assuming this for the moment, we can see that, using the numerical values of [GJ03] , our scheme leads to a gain of ℓ r = 111 bits per signature.
Security of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we reduce the security of the proposed scheme to the security of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The proof consists in showing that the proposed scheme is a proof that DL h (z) = DL g (y) = x.
Theorem 2. Let A be an adversary which can produce, with success probability ε, an existential forgery under a chosen-message attack within time τ , after q h queries to the hash oracles and q s queries to the signing oracle, in the random oracle model. Then the computational Diffie-Hellman problem can be solved with success probability ε ′ within time τ ′ , with
Proof. We are given a group G g,q and a CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ). We will use an attacker A against our signature scheme to solve this challenge, i.e., to find g ax . Our attacker A, after q H (resp. q G ) hash queries to H (resp. G) oracle and q s signature queries, is able to produce a signature forgery with probability ε within time τ . We let q h = q H + q G .
Answering new G(m, g, h, y, z, u, v) query: The simulator returns a random number in Z q .
Answering new H(u) query:
The simulator generates a random number d ∈ Z q , and returns (g a ) g d . All queries u are stored in a list called U-List.
Answering signatures query on m ∈ M: The simulator randomly generates (κ, s, c) ∈ (Z q ) 3 . Then, it computes u = g s y −c . If H(u) is already set, the simulator stops (Event 1). Else, the simulator sets h = H(u) = g κ and computes z = (g x ) κ -remark that DL h (z) = DL g (y)(= x). Finally, the simulator computes v = h s z −c . If G(m, g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set, the simulator stops and fails (Event 2). Else, the simulator sets G(m, g, h, y, z, u, v) = c, and returns the valid signature (z, s, c). All u's computed during signature queries are stored in a list called Υ -List
As we can see, this simulator is valid and indistinguishable from an actual signer, except for some events:
-Event 1: As u is a random number in G g,q , the probability that the H(u) is already set is less than qs+qH q , for one signature query. For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by qs·(qs+qH) q . -Event 2: From the simulation, the input tuples to the G oracle are of the form (m, g, h, y, z, u, v) = (m, g, g κ , y, y κ , g k , g κk ) for k ∈ Z q and κ which is determined by the relation h = H(g k ) = g κ ; but as Event 1 did not happened, h is absolutely unknown for the attacker, and so κ is a random integer of Z q . Then, the probability that G(m, g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set is less than qs+qG q 2 . For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by
As a conclusion, except with a probability smaller than δ sim = q s q h +2qs q , the simulation is successful.
In other words, with a probability ε sim ≥ ε − δ sim , the attacker A is able to return a valid signature forgery (ẑ,ŝ,ĉ) on a messagem ∈ M that was never submitted to the signature oracle. The simulator deduces from this forgery the corresponding tuple (û,v,ĥ), by the following computations:û = gŝ y −ĉ ,ĥ = H(û), andv =ĥŝẑ −ĉ . Notably, if H(û) has not been queried to the H oracle by the attacker or set by the signature oracle, the simulator queries it to the H oracle itself. Hence,û is a member of U-List or a member of Υ -List.
Solving the CDH challenge (g, g
x , g a ). At this step, once the forgery is returned by the attacker, there are two cases, contrary to the proof of EDL.
In the first case,û is a member of U-List. This is the case that corresponds to the only case of the proof of EDL. As in EDL, we writeû = g k ,v =ĥ
x ′ , and we get, as the signature is valid, k =ŝ −ĉx mod q and
was not set during a signature query, and so we know that DLĥ(ẑ) = DL g (y)(= x), except with a probability qG q . Apart this error, the simulator receives from the attacker a signature withẑ =ĥ x , and it knows d such thatĥ = H(û) = (g a ) g d . Then the simulator can return the solution to the CDH challenge, which isẑ (g x ) −d . In this first case, the forgery is successfully used to solve the CDH challenge, except with a probability smaller than δ 1 = q h q .
In the second case,û is not a member of U-List, and so is a member of Υ -List. This case can happen, contrary to the EDL signature scheme, as there is no message in the input of H, and so we can imagine that the attacker reuse a u that corresponds to a u of a signature given by the signature oracle. Then, the simulator can recover from its log files all quantities that correspond to this u =û, i.e., h, v, z, s, c and m.
At this moment, we can see that we have u = g s y −c =û = gŝ y −ĉ . It is exactly the kind of hypothesis that is used by the forking lemma to prove a (loose) security. But here, this equality is not obtained by restarting the attacker (as it is done in the forking lemma), but just by construction. More precisely, we can recover easily the private key x, as far asĉ = c mod q.
As the messagem is new, c =ĉ or a collision on G function happened, between a G returned the signature simulation and a G returned by a direct G query, which occurs with a probability smaller than qs·qG q . Hence, except an error with a probability smaller than δ 2 = qs·qG q , we haveĉ = c, and so we can recover the private key x: equation s − xc =ŝ − xĉ mod q gives x = s−ŝ c−ĉ mod q. We can see that this second case gives not only the solution to the CDH challenge, but also the solution to the discrete logarithm.
As a conclusion, we can see that in both cases, our simulator can transform the forgery given by the attacker into the solution to the CDH challenge.
Putting all together, the success probability ε ′ of our reduction satisfies ε ′ ≥ ε − δ sim − max(δ 1 , δ 2 ), which gives, using q H + q G = q h ,
and the running time τ ′ satisfies
As we can see, our scheme is tight, as far as
Our Proposed Scheme with Coupons
Interestingly, our scheme allows what we call a cost-free use of coupons. By this, we mean that the signer is free to choose to use coupons or not: this choice of the signer does not affect the verifier as the verification step remains unchanged. This is done in a very natural way: the signature step (cf. Section 4.1) is simply split into two steps.
Off-line signature: To create a new coupon, one randomly chooses k ∈ Z q and computes u = g k , h = H(u), z = h x and v = h k . The coupon is the tuple (u, v, h, z, k). On-line signature: To sign a message m ∈ M, one uses a fresh coupon (u, v, h, z, k) and just computes c = G(m, g, h, y, z, u, v) and s = k + cx mod q. The signature on m is σ = (z, s, c).
The verification step remains the same. This property is very useful as it allows the signer to precompute coupons and to sign on-line very quickly, namely, by just performing one hash function evaluation followed by one modular multiplication.
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As previously described, our scheme features a coupon size of (4ℓ p + ℓ q ) bits. This size can be reduced to (3ℓ p + ℓ q ) bits by not storing the value of h, i.e., a coupon is defined as (u, v, z, k). Then, h = H(u) is evaluated in the on-line step. This option turns out useful for memory constrained devices like smart cards.
An even more sophisticated solution that minimizes the size of the coupon is described in Appendix A.
Size of Parameters
In this section, we show how to set the values of ℓ q and ℓ p to attain a security level of 2 κ . Our analysis basically follows Goh and Jarecki's for EDL. Assuming we take the best (q h , q s , τ, ε)-attacker against our scheme, he can find a forgery in an average time of τ ε . Letting τ = 2 n and ε = 2 −e , we get log 2 ( τ ε ) = n+ e = κ, by definition of the security level of our scheme.
Furthermore, we can use this attacker, as shown in the proof of Section 4.2, to solve the CDH problem in a time of √ q) security for the discrete logarithm in G g,q , we have ℓ q ≥ 2κ ′ . We use the cost of the evaluation of a hash function as the unit of time. Hence, q h ≤ 2 n . We suppose that τ 0 (the time for an exponentiation in G g,q ) is 100 times the time of a hash function evaluation. So, using q s ≤ q h , we obtain that τ ′ ≃ 2 n+7 and ε
. As long as q s ≤ 2 ℓq−e−3−n = 2 ℓq−κ−3 (e.g., κ = 80, q s ≤ 2 80 , q h ≤ 2 80 and ℓ q ≥ 176), we have ε ′ 2 −e−1 . Then, log 2 ( τ ′ ε ′ ) n + 7 + e + 1 = κ + 8. We finally obtain κ ≥ κ ′ − 8. For example, if the targeted security level is κ = 80, it is sufficient to use κ ′ = 88 (and hence ℓ q ≥ 176). It proves that our scheme is very efficient in terms of signature size, as we can use the same subgroup G g,q as the one used by Goh and Jarecki for EDL and have the same security. One can remark that our scheme remains secure even if we limit q s to 2 80 , while in EDL, q s was limited to 2 30 , or the random number r was made appropriately longer.
Detailed Comparison with EDL, the Katz-Wang Scheme and Other Schemes
In this paragraph, we sum up the advantages of our scheme. Compared to EDL, our scheme features 1. faster signatures with a cost-free use of coupons: the on-line part only requires one hash function evaluation followed by one modular multiplication in Z q , while in EDL, this phase consists of two hash function evaluations and two modular exponentiations in G g,q ; 2. same verification step efficiency; 3. shorter signatures of ℓ r ≥ 111 bits: in a subgroup of F p * , taking ℓ p = 1024 and ℓ q = 176, this represents an improvement of 7%. In the elliptic curve setting, the gain is even more sensible, as z can be represented with a length around ℓ q = 176, resulting in an improvement of 17%.
Compared to the Katz-Wang scheme, our scheme features 1. faster signatures with a cost-free use of coupons: the on-line part only requires one hash function evaluation followed by one modular multiplication in Z q , while in Katz-Wang signature scheme, this phase consists of two hash function evaluations and two modular exponentiations in G g,q ; 2. same verification step efficiency; 3. less significantly, shorter signatures of 1 bit and a security parameter greater of 1 bit; 4. smaller key size, as computing b by a PRF or in another way require an additional key, that should better not be related to the private key x.
Furthermore, as noticed in [KW03] , the computation of an hash H : G g,q → G g,q can be very long, namely it costs an exponentiation of (ℓ p − ℓ q ) bits, which is much longer than the two exponentiations in G g,q . In our scheme, this hash computation is done off-line, contrary to EDL and Katz-Wang schemes.
Compared to the off-line/on-line version of EDL, EDL-CH, the off-line/online version of our scheme presents 1. faster and unchanged verification step (remember that EDL-CH relies on chameleon hashes, which requires additional exponentiations); 2. shorter signatures, i.e., ℓ q ≥ 176 bits less than EDL-CH ; again, in a subgroup of F p * , taking ℓ p = 1024 and ℓ q = 176, this represents an improvement of 11% and of 25% in the elliptic curve setting.
Finally, owing to its security tightness, our scheme fulfills or even improves most of the advantages of EDL that were presented by Goh and Jarecki, by comparison with other discrete-logarithm schemes, such as Schnorr signature, with same security level.
On the one hand, using our scheme in G g,q ⊆ F p * , we can use a field 8 times smaller and a subgroup of order twice smaller than in other discrete-logarithm schemes (as in EDL). Notably, it means that public keys are smaller by a factor of 8, private keys are smaller by a factor of 2. In this case, our signatures are about twice as long as other discrete-logarithm schemes.
On the other hand, in the elliptic curve setting, our public and private keys are smaller by a factor of 2 and our signatures are 25% smaller than in previously known schemes.
This clearly shows the advantages of the proposed scheme.
Conclusion
At Eurocrypt '03, Goh and Jarecki gave a proof that the security of EDL is tightly related to the CDH problem, in the random oracle model. They also proposed to use the technique of Shamir and Tauman, based on chameleon hash functions, to get a version of EDL scheme with coupons: EDL-CH.
In this paper, we have proposed a new signature scheme which, similarly to EDL, features a tight security reduction relatively to the CDH problem but whose resulting signatures are smaller: if coupons are not used, we gain ℓ r bits compared to EDL signatures; in the off-line/on-line version, we gain ℓ q bits compared to EDL-CH signatures. Furthermore, contrary to EDL, no additional trick is needed to turn our signature scheme in an off-line/on-line version.
Our scheme represents to date the most efficient scheme of any signature scheme with a tight security reduction in the discrete-log setting.
Theorem 3. Let A be an adversary which can produce, with success probability ε, an existential forgery under a chosen-message attack within time τ , after q h queries to the hash oracles and q s queries to the signing oracle, in the random oracle model. Then the computational Diffie-Hellman problem can be solved with success probability ε ′ within time τ ′ , with
Proof. We are given a group G g,q and a CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ). We will use an attacker A against this variant of our signature scheme to solve this challenge, i.e., to find g ax . Our attacker A, after q H (resp. q G , q I ) hash queries to the H (resp. G, I) oracle and q s signature queries, is able to produce a signature forgery with probability ε within time τ . We let q h = q H + q G + q I .
Initialization: A is initialized with public key y = g x and public parameters (g, q, G g,q ). Answering new G(m, t) query: The simulator returns a random number in Z q . Answering new H(u) query: The simulator generates a random number d ∈ Z q , and returns (g a ) g d . All queries u are stored in a list called U-List.
Answering new I(g, h, y, z, u, v) query: The simulator returns a random number of ℓ t bits. Answering signatures query on m ∈ M: The simulator randomly generates (κ, s, c) ∈ (Z q ) 3 . Then, it computes u = g s y −c . If H(u) is already set, the simulator stops (Event 1). Else, the simulator sets h = H(u) = g κ and computes z = (g a ) κ -remark that DL h (z) = DL g (y)(= x). Finally, the simulator computes v = h s z −c . If I(g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set, the simulator stops (Event 2). Else, the simulator takes a random number t of ℓ t bits, and sets I(g, h, y, z, u, v) = t. If G(m, t) is already set, the simulator stops and fails (Event 3). Else, the simulator sets G(m, t) = c, and returns the valid signature (z, s, c). All u's computed during signature queries are stored in a list called Υ -List
-Event 1: As u is a random number in G g,q , the probability that the H(u) is already set is less than qH+qs q , for one signature query. For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by qs·(qs+qH) q .
-Event 2: From the simulation, the input tuples to the I oracle are of the form (g, h, y, z, u, v) = (g, g κ , y, y κ , g k , g κk ) for k ∈ Z q and κ which is determined by relation H(g k ) = g κ . Then, the probability that I(g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set is less than qs+qI q . For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by qs·(qs+qI ) q .
-Event 3: As t is a random number, the probability that G(m, t) is already set is less than qs+qG 2 ℓ t . For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by
As a conclusion, except with a probability of δ sim ≤ q s qH+qI +2qs q + qs+qG 2 ℓ t , the simulation is successful.
In other words, with a probability ε sim ≥ ε − δ sim , the attacker A is able to return a valid signature (ẑ,ŝ,ĉ) on a messagem ∈ M that was never submitted to the signature oracle. The simulator deduces from this forgery the corresponding tuple (û,v,ĥ,t), by the following computations:û = gŝ y −ĉ ,ĥ = H(û),v = hŝẑ −ĉ andt = I(g,ĥ, y,ẑ,û,v). Notably, if H(û) has not been queried to the H oracle by the attacker or set by the signature oracle, the simulator queries it to the H oracle itself. Hence,û is a member of U-List or a member of Υ -List.
Solving the CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ). At this step, once the forgery is returned by the attacker, there are two cases, contrary to the proof of EDL.
In the first case,û is member of U-List. This is the case that corresponds to the only case of the proof of the EDL scheme. As in EDL, we writeû = g k , v =ĥ k ′ andẑ =ĥ x ′ , and we get, as the signature is valid, k =ŝ −ĉx mod q and k ′ =ŝ −ĉx ′ mod q. Then, if x = x ′ , we havet = I(g,ĥ, y,ĥ
As the forgery is a forgery on a new message, which means that G(m,t) was not set during a signature query, this shows that DLĥ(ẑ) = DL g (y)(= x), except with a probability qG q . Apart this error, the simulator receives from the attacker a signature witĥ z =ĥ x , and it knows d such thatĥ = H(û) = (g a ) g d . Then, the simulator can return the solution to the CDH challenge, which isẑ (g x ) −d . In this first case, the forgery is successfully used to solve the CDH challenge, except with a probability smaller than δ 1 = q h q . In the second case,û is not a member of U-List, and so is a member of Υ -List. This case can happen, contrary to the EDL signature scheme, as there is no message in the input of H, and so we can imagine that the attacker reuse a u that corresponds to a u of a signature given by the signature oracle. Then, the simulator can recover from its log files all quantities that correspond to this u =û, and notably s, t, c and m.
At this moment, we can see that we have u = g s y −c =û = gŝ y −ĉ . It is exactly the kind of hypothesis that is used by the forking lemma to prove a (loose) security. But here, this equality is not obtained by restarting the attacker (as it is done in the forking lemma), but just by construction. More precisely, we can recover easily the private key x, as far asĉ = c.
As m =m (the forgery is a forgery on a new message), c =ĉ, or a collision collision on G function happened, between a G returned the signature simulation and a G returned by a direct G query, which occurs with a probability smaller than qs·qG q . Hence, except an error with a probability smaller than δ 2 = qs·qG q , we haveĉ = c, and so we can recover the private key x: equation s−xc =ŝ−xĉ mod q gives x = s−ŝ c−ĉ mod q. One can see that this second case gives not only the solution to CDH challenge, but also the solution to the discrete logarithm.
As a conclusion, we can see that in both cases, our simulator can transform a forgery given by the attacker into the solution to the CDH challenge.
Putting all together, the success probability ε ′ of our reduction satisfies ε ′ ≥ ε − δ sim − max(δ 1 , δ 2 ), which gives, using q H + q G + q I = q h ,
Furthermore, the running time τ ′ of this simulation is such that
Step of Our Idea: Smaller Signatures Tightly Based on CDH
In a pedagogical purpose, we propose hereafter the first improvement that we thought about, in order to reduce the size of EDL's signature. Anyway, we remind that there is no objective reason to prefer this version to our scheme that we described in Section 4.1.
B.1 Our Construction
The resulting scheme proceeds as follows (the global set-up and key generation are unchanged; cf. Section 3.1):
Signature: To sign a message m ∈ M, one first randomly chooses k ∈ Z q , and computes u = g k , h = H(m, u), z = h x , v = h k , c = G(g, h, y, z, u, v) and s = k + cx mod q. The signature on m is σ = (z, s, c). Verification: To verify a signature σ = (z, s, c) ∈ G g,q × (Z q ) 2 on a message m ∈ M, one computes u ′ = g s y −c , h ′ = H(m, u ′ ) and v ′ = h ′ s z −c . The signature is accepted iff c = G(g, h ′ , y, z, u ′ , v ′ ).
This modification to EDL gives a better bandwidth (signatures are ℓ r bits smaller than regular EDL signatures). The security reduction is similar to the one of Section 3.2 and is given in the following.
B.2 Security of This Construction
About the security of this scheme, the following theorem stands:
Theorem 4. Let A be an adversary which can produce, with success probability ε, an existential forgery under a chosen-message attack within time τ , after q h queries to the hash oracles and q s queries to the signing oracle, in the random oracle model. Then the computational Diffie-Hellman problem can be solved with success probability ε ′ within time τ ′ , with ε ′ ≥ ε − q s 2q s + q h q − q h q and τ ′ τ + (6q s + q h )τ 0 where τ 0 the time for an exponentiation in G g,q .
Proof. We are given a group G g,q and a CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ). We will use an attacker A against our variant of the EDL signature scheme to solve this challenge, i.e., to find g ax . Our attacker A, after q H (resp. q G ) hash queries to H (resp. G) oracle and q s signature queries, is able to produce a signature forgery with probability ε within time τ . We let q h = q H + q G .
Answering new H(m, u) query: The simulator generates a random number d ∈ Z q , and returns (g a ) g d .
Answering signatures query of m ∈ M: The simulator generates random (κ, s, c) ∈ (Z q ) 3 . It computes u = g s y −c . If H(m, u) is already set, the simulator stops and fails (Event 1). Else, the simulator sets h = H(m, u) = g κ and computes z = (g x ) κ -remark that DL h (z) = DL g (y)(= x). Finally, the simulator computes v = h s z −c . If G(g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set, the simulator fails and stops (Event 2). Else, the simulator sets G(g, h, y, z, u, v) = c and returns the valid signature (z, s, c).
-Event 1: As (s, c) are random in Z q × Z q , and as u = g s y −c , u is a random number in G g,q and so the probability that H(m, u) is already set is less than qH+qs q , for one signature query. For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by qs·(qH+qs) q .
-Event 2: From the simulation, the input tuples to the G oracle are of the form (g, h, y, z, u, v) = (g, g κ , y, y κ , g k , g κk ) for k ∈ Z q and κ which is determined by relation H(g k ) = g κ . Then, the probability that G(g, h, y, z, u, v) is already set is less than qs+qG q . For q s signature queries, the failure probability is thus upper bounded by qs·(qs+qG ) q .
Solving the CDH challenge (g, g x , g a ): Except when these two rare events occur, attacker A returns, with probability ε, a valid signature forgery σ = (z, s, c) on a message m that was not submitted to the signature oracle, with h = H(m, u) = (g a ) g d for some d known to the simulator. Then, provided that DL h (z) = DL g (y) = x, the solution to the CDH challenge is z (g x ) −d .
As for EDL signature scheme, DL h (z) = DL g (y) = x, except with a probability qG q . We get hence the conclusion that our variant of EDL signature scheme is tightly as secure as the Diffie-Hellman problem. The success probability ε ′ of our reduction satisfies
Furthermore, the running time τ ′ of this simulation satisfies
